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Abstract. We address the problem of how to “obfuscate” texts by removing
stylistic clues which can identify authorship, whilst preserving (as much as possi-
ble) the content of the text. In this paper we combine ideas from “generalised dif-
ferential privacy” and machine learning techniques for text processing to model
privacy for text documents. We define a privacy mechanism that operates at the
level of text documents represented as “bags-of-words” — these representations
are typical in machine learning and contain sufficient information to carry out
many kinds of classification tasks including topic identification and authorship
attribution (of the original documents). We show that our mechanism satisfies pri-
vacy with respect to a metric for semantic similarity, thereby providing a balance
between utility, defined by the semantic content of texts, with the obfuscation
of stylistic clues. We demonstrate our implementation on a “fan fiction” dataset,
confirming that it is indeed possible to disguise writing style effectively whilst
preserving enough information and variation for accurate content classification
tasks.
Keywords: Generalised differential privacy, Earth Mover’s metric, natural lan-
guage processing, author obfuscation.
1 Introduction
Partial public release of formerly classified data incurs the risk that more information
is disclosed than intended. This is particularly true of data in the form of text such
as government documents or patient health records. Nevertheless there are sometimes
compelling reasons for declassifying data in some kind of “sanitised” form — for ex-
ample government documents are frequently released as redacted reports when the law
demands it, and health records are often shared to facilitate medical research. Saniti-
sation is most commonly carried out by hand but, aside from the cost incurred in time
and money, this approach provides no guarantee that the original privacy or security
concerns are met.
To encourage researchers to focus on privacy issues related to text documents the
digital forensics community PAN@Clef ([41], for example) proposed a number of chal-
lenges that are typically tackled using machine learning. In this paper our aim is to
demonstrate how to use ideas from differential privacy to address some aspects of the
PAN@Clef challenges by showing how to provide strong a priori privacy guarantees in
document disclosures.
? We acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council Grant DP140101119.
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We focus on the problem of author obfuscation, namely to automate the process of
changing a given document so that as much as possible of its original substance remains,
but that the author of the document can no longer be identified. Author obfuscation
is very difficult to achieve because it is not clear exactly what to change that would
sufficiently mask the author’s identity. In fact author properties can be determined by
“writing style” with a high degree of accuracy: this can include author identity [27] or
other undisclosed personal attributes such as native language [32, 51], gender or age
[15, 26]. These techniques have been deployed in real world scenarios: native language
identification was used as part of the effort to identify the anonymous perpetrators of
the 2014 Sony hack [16], and it is believed that the US NSA used author attribution
techniques to uncover the identity of the real humans behind the fictitious persona of
Bitcoin “creator” Satoshi Nakamoto.3
Our contribution concentrates on the perspective of the “machine learner” as an ad-
versary that works with the standard “bag-of-words” representation of documents often
used in text processing tasks. A bag-of-words representation retains only the original
document’s words and their frequency (thus forgetting the order in which the words oc-
cur). Remarkably this representation still contains sufficient information to enable the
original authors to be identified (by a stylistic analysis) as well as the document’s topic
to be classified, both with a significant degree of accuracy. 4 Within this context we
reframe the PAN@Clef author obfuscation challenge as follows:
Given an input bag-of-words representation of a text document, provide a
mechanism which changes the input without disturbing its topic classification,
but that the author can no longer be identified.
In the rest of the paper we use ideas inspired by dX -privacy [9], a metric-based ex-
tension of differential privacy, to implement an automated privacy mechanism which,
unlike current ad hoc approaches to author obfuscation, gives access to both solid pri-
vacy and utility guarantees.5
We implement a mechanism K which takes b, b′ bag-of-words inputs and produces
“noisy” bag-of-words outputs determined byK(b),K(b′)with the following properties:
Privacy: If b, b′ are classified to be “similar in topic” then, depending on a privacy param-
eter  the outputs determined by K(b) and K(b′) are also “similar to each other”,
irrespective of authorship.
Utility: Possible outputs determined by K(b) are distributed according to a Laplace proba-
bility density function scored according to a semantic similarity metric.
In what follows we define semantic similarity in terms of the classic Earth Mover’s
distance used in machine learning for topic classification in text document processing. 6
3 https://medium.com/cryptomuse/how-the-nsa-caught-satoshi-nakamoto-868affcef595
4 This includes, for example, the character n-gram representation used for author identification
in [28].
5 Our notion of utility here is similar to other work aiming at text privacy, such as [31, 53].
6 In NLP, this distance measure is known as the Word Mover’s distance. We use the classic Earth
Mover’s here for generality.
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We explain how to combine this with dX -privacy which extends privacy for databases
to other unstructured domains (such as texts).
In §2 we set out the details of the bag-of-words representation of documents and
define the Earth Mover’s metric for topic classification. In §3 we define a generic mech-
anism which satisfies “EdX -privacy” relative to the Earth Mover’s metricEdX and show
how to use it for our obfuscation problem. We note that our generic mechanism is of in-
dependent interest for other domains where the Earth Mover’s metric applies. In §4 we
describe how to implement the mechanism for data represented as real-valued vectors
and prove its privacy/utility properties with respect to the Earth Mover’s metric; in §5
we show how this applies to bags-of-words. Finally in §6 we provide an experimental
evaluation of our obfuscation mechanism, and discuss the implications.
Throughout we assume standard definitions of probability spaces [17]. For a set A
we write DA for the set of (possibly continuous) probability distributions over A. For
η ∈ DA, and A ⊆ A a (measurable) subset we write η(A) for the probability that (wrt.
η) a randomly selected a is contained in A. In the special case of singleton sets, we
write η{a}. If mechanism K:α→Dα, we write K(a)(A) for the probability that if the
input is a, then the output will be contained in A.
2 Documents, topic classification and Earth Moving
In this section we summarise the elements from machine learning and text processing
needed for this paper. Our first definition sets out the representation for documents we
shall use throughout. It is a typical representation of text documents used in a variety of
classification tasks.
Definition 1. Let S be the set of all words (drawn from a finite alphabet). A document
is defined to be a finite bag over S, also called a bag-of-words. We denote the set of
documents as BS, i.e. the set of (finite) bags over S.
Once a text is represented as a bag-of-words, depending on the processing task,
further representations of the words within the bag are usually required. We shall focus
on two important representations: the first is when the task is semantic analysis for eg.
topic classification, and the second is when the task is author identification. We describe
the representation for topic classification in this section, and leave the representation for
author identification for §5 and §6.
2.1 Word embeddings
Machine learners can be trained to classify the topic of a document, such as “health”,
“sport”, “entertainment”; this notion of topic means that the words within documents
will have particular semantic relationships to each other. There are many ways to do
this classification, and in this paper we use a technique that has as a key component
“word embeddings”, which we summarise briefly here.
A word embedding is a real-valued vector representation of words where the precise
representation has been experimentally determined by a neural network sensitive to
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the way words are used in sentences [37]. Such embeddings have some interesting
properties, but here we only rely on the fact that when the embeddings are compared
using a distance determined by a pseudometric7 on Rn, words with similar meanings
are found to be close together as word embeddings, and words which are significantly
different in meaning are far apart as word embeddings.
Definition 2. An n-dimensional word embedding is a mapping Vec : S → Rn. Given a
pseudometric dist on Rn we define a distance on words distVec : S×S→R≥ as follows:
distVec(w1, w2) := dist(Vec(w1),Vec(w2)) .
Observe that the property of a pseudometric on Rn carries over to S.
Lemma 1. If dist is a pseudometric on Rn then distVec is also a pseudometric on S.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of a pseudometric: i.e. the triangle equality and
the symmetry of distVec are inherited from dist.
Word embeddings are particularly suited to language analysis tasks, including topic
classification, due to their useful semantic properties. Their effectiveness depends on
the quality of the embedding Vec, which can vary depending on the size and quality
of the training data. We provide more details of the particular embeddings in §6. Topic
classifiers can also differ on the choice of underlying metric dist, and we discuss varia-
tions in §3.2.
In addition, once the word embedding Vec has been determined, and the distance
dist has been selected for comparing “word meanings”, there are a variety of semantic
similarity measures that can be used to compare documents, for us bags-of-words. In
this work we use the “Word Mover’s Distance”, which was shown to perform well
across multiple text classification tasks [30].
The Word Mover’s Distance is based on the classic Earth Mover’s Distance [43]
used in transportation problems with a given distance measure. We shall use the more
general Earth Mover’s definition with dist 8 as the underlying distance measure between
words. We note that our results can be applied to problems outside of the text processing
domain.
Let X,Y ∈ BS; we denote by X the tuple 〈xa11 , xa22 , . . . , xakk 〉, where ai is the
number of times that xi occurs in X . Similarly we write Y = 〈yb11 , yb22 , . . . , ybll 〉; we
have
∑
i ai = |X| and
∑
j bj = |Y |, the sizes of X and Y respectively. We define a
flow matrix F ∈ Rk×l≥0 where Fij represents the (non-negative) amount of flow from
xi ∈ X to yj ∈ Y .
Definition 3. (Earth Mover’s Distance) Let dS be a (pseudo)metric over S. The Earth
Mover’s Distance with respect to dS , denoted by EdS , is the solution to the following
7 Recall that a pseudometric satisfies both the triangle inequality and symmetry; but different
words could be mapped to the same vector and so distVec(w1, w2) = 0 no longer implies that
w1 = w2.
8 In our experiments we take dist to be defined by the Euclidean distance.
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linear optimisation:
EdS (X,Y ) := min
∑
xi∈X
∑
yj∈Y
dS(xi, yj)Fij , subject to: (1)
k∑
i=1
Fij =
bj
|Y | and
l∑
j=1
Fij =
ai
|X| , Fij ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ l (2)
where the minimum in (1) is over all possible flow matrices F subject to the constraints
(2). In the special case that |X| = |Y |, the solution is known to satisfy the conditions
of a (pseudo)metric [43] which we call the Earth Mover’s Metric.
In this paper we are interested in the special case |X| = |Y |, hence we use the term
Earth Mover’s metric to refer to EdS .
We end this section by describing how texts are prepared for machine learning tasks,
and how Def. 3 is used to distinguish documents. Consider the text snippet “The Presi-
dent greets the press in Chicago”. The first thing is to remove all “stopwords” – these are
words which do not contribute to semantics, and include things like prepositions, pro-
nouns and articles. The words remaining are those that contain a great deal of semantic
and stylistic traits.9
In this case we obtain the bag:
b1 := 〈President1, greets1, press1, Chicago1〉 .
Consider a second bag: b2:= 〈Chief1, speaks1,media1, Illinois1〉, corresponding to a
different text. Fig. 1 illustrates the optimal flow matrix which solves the optimisation
problem in Def. 3 relative to dS . Here each word is mapped completely to another word,
so that Fi,j = 1/4 when i = j and 0 otherwise. We show later that this is always the
case between bags of the same size. With these choices we can compute the distance
between b1, b2:
EdS (b1, b2) =
1
4
(dS(President,Chief) + dS(greets, speaks)+
dS(press,media) + dS(Chicago, Illinois)) (3)
= 2.816 .
For comparison, consider the distance between b1 and b2 to a third document,
b3:= 〈Chef1, breaks1, cooking1, record1〉. Using the same word embedding metric, 10
we find that EdS (b1, b3) = 4.121 and EdS (b2, b3) = 3.941. Thus b1, b2 would be clas-
sified as semantically “closer” to each other than to b3, in line with our own (linguistic)
interpretation of the original texts.
9 In fact the way that stopwords are used in texts turn out to be characteristic features of au-
thorship. Here we follow standard practice in natural language processing to remove them for
efficiency purposes and study the privacy of what remains. All of our results apply equally
well had we left stopwords in place.
10 We use the same word2vec-based metric as per our experiments; this is described in §6.
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Fig. 1: Earth Mover’s metric between sample documents.
3 Differential Privacy and the Earth Mover’s Metric
Differential Privacy was originally defined with the protection of individuals’ data in
mind. The intuition is that privacy is achieved through “plausible deniability”, i.e. what-
ever output is obtained from a query, it could have just as easily have arisen from a
database that does not contain an individual’s details, as from one that does. In partic-
ular, there should be no easy way to distinguish between the two possibilities. Privacy
in text processing means something a little different. A “query” corresponds to releas-
ing the topic-related contents of the document (in our case the bag-of-words) — this
relates to the utility because we would like to reveal the semantic content. The privacy
relates to investing individual documents with plausible deniability, rather than indi-
vidual authors directly. What this means for privacy is the following. Suppose we are
given two documents b1, b2 written by two distinct authors A1, A2, and suppose further
that b1, b2 are changed through a privacy mechanism so that it is difficult or impossible
to distinguish between them (by any means). Then it is also difficult or impossible to
determine whether the authors of the original documents are A1 or A2, or some other
author entirely. This is our aim for obfuscating authorship whilst preserving semantic
content.
Our approach to obfuscating documents replaces words with other words, governed
by probability distributions over possible replacements. Thus the type of our mecha-
nism is BS → D(BS), where (recall) D(BS) is the set of probability distributions over
the set of (finite) bags of S. Since we are aiming to find a careful trade-off between
utility and privacy, our objective is to ensure that there is a high probability of out-
putting a document with a similar topic as the input document. As explained in §2,
topic similarity of documents is determined by the Earth Mover’s distance relative to a
given (pseudo)metric on word embeddings, and so our privacy definition must also be
relative to the Earth Mover’s distance.
Definition 4. (Earth Mover’s Privacy) Let X be a set, and dX be a (pseudo)metric
on X and let EdX be the Earth Mover’s metric on BX relative to dX . Given  ≥ 0,
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a mechanism K : BX → D(BX ) satisfies EdX -privacy iff for any b, b′ ∈ BX and
Z ⊆ BX :
K(b)(Z) ≤ eEdX (b,b′)K(b′)(Z) . (4)
Def. 4 tells us that when two documents are measured to be very close, so that EdX (b, b
′)
is close to 0, then the multiplier eEdX (b,b
′) is approximately 1 and the outputsK(b) and
K(b′) are almost identical. On the other hand the more that the input bags can be dis-
tinguished by EdX , the more their outputs are likely to differ. This flexibility is what
allows us to strike a balance between utility and privacy; we discuss this issue further
in §5 below.
Our next task is to show how to implement a mechanism that can be proved to satisfy
Def. 4. We follow the basic construction of Dwork et al. [12] for lifting a differentially
private mechanismK:X→DX to a differentially private mechanismK?:XN→DXN
on vectors in XN . (Note that, unlike a bag, a vector imposes a fixed order on its com-
ponents.) Here the idea is to apply K independently to each component of a vector
v ∈ XN to produce a random output vector, also in XN . In particular the probability of
outputting some vector v′ is the product:
K?(v){v′} =
∏
1≤i≤N
K(vi){v′i} . (5)
Thanks to the compositional properties of differential privacy when the underlying met-
ric on X satisfies the triangle inequality, it’s possible to show that the resulting mecha-
nism K? satisfies the following privacy mechanism [13]:
K?(v)(Z) ≤ eMdX (v,v′)K?(v′)(Z) , (6)
where MdX (v, v
′):=
∑
1≤i≤N dX (vi, v
′
i), the Manhattan metric relative to dX .
However Def. 4 does not follow from (6), since Def. 4 operates on bags of size N ,
and the Manhattan distance between any vector representation of bags is greater than
N × EdX . Remarkably however, it turns out that K? –the mechanism that applies K
independently to each item in a given bag– in fact satisfies the much stronger Def. 4, as
the following theorem shows, provided the input bags have the same size as each other.
Theorem 1. Let dX be a pseudo-metric on X and let K : X → DX be a mechanism
satisfying dX -privacy, i.e.
K(x)(Z) ≤ edX (x,x′)K(x′)(Z) , for all x, x′ ∈ X , Z ⊆ X . (7)
Let K? : BX → D(BX ) be the mechanism obtained by applying K independently
to each element of X for any X ∈ BX . Denote by K?↓N the restriction of K? to bags
of fixed size N . Then K?↓N satisfies NEdX -privacy.
Proof. (Sketch) The full proof is given in App. A.1; here we sketch the main ideas.
Let b, b′ be input bags, both of size N , and let c a possible output bag (of K?).
Observe that both output bags determined by K?(b1),K?(b2) and c also have size N .
We shall show that (4) is satisfied for the set containing the singleton element c and
multiplier N , from which it follows that (4) is satisfied for all sets Z.
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By Birkhoff-von Neumann’s theorem ([25], Thm. A1), in the case where all bags
have the same size, the minimisation problem in Def. 3 is optimised for transportation
matrix F where all values Fij are either 0 or 1/N . This implies that the optimal trans-
portation for EdX (b, c) is achieved by moving each word in the bag b to a (single) word
in bag c. The same is true for EdX (b
′, c) and EdX (b, b
′). Next we use a vector repre-
sentation of bags as follows. For bag b, we write b for a vector in XN such that each
element in b appears at some bi.
Next we fix b and b′ to be vector representations of respectively b, b′ in XN such that
the optimal transportation for EdX (b, b
′) is
EdX (b, b
′) = 1/N×
∑
1≤i≤N
dX (bi, b
′
i) = MdX (b, b
′)/N . (8)
The final fact we need is to note that there is a relationship between K? acting on
bags of size N and K? which acts on vectors in XN by applying K independently to
each component of a vector: it is characterised in the following way. Let b, c be bags
and let b, c be any vector representations. For permutation σ ∈ {1 . . . N}→ {1 . . . N}
write cσ to be the vector with components permuted by σ, so that cσi = cσ(i). With these
definitions, the following equality between probabilities holds:
K?(b){c} =
∑
σ
K?(b){cσ} , (9)
where the summation is over all permutations that give distinct vector representations
of c. We now compute directly:
K?(b){c}
=
∑
σK
?(b){cσ} “(9) for b, c”
≤ ∑σ eMd(b,b′)K?(b′){cσ} “(6) for b, b′, c”
= eNEd(b,b
′)∑
σK
?(b′){cσ} “Arithmetic and (8)”
= eNEd(b,b
′)K?(b′){c} , “(9) for b′, c”
as required.
3.1 Application to Text Documents
Recall the bag-of-words
b2 := 〈Chief1, speaks1,media1, Illinois1〉 ,
and assume we are provided with a mechanism K satisfying the standard dX -privacy
property (7) for individual words. As in Thm. 1 we can create a mechanism K∗ by
applying K independently to each word in the bag, so that, for example the probability
of outputting b3 = 〈Chef1, breaks1, cooking1, record1〉 is determined by (9):
K?(b2)({b3}) =
∑
σ
∏
1≤i≤4
K(b2i){b3iσ} .
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By Thm. 1, K? satisfies 4EdS -privacy. Recalling (3) that EdS (b1, b2) = 2.816,
we deduce that if  ∼ 1/16 then the output distributions K?(b1) and K?(b2) would
differ by the multiplier e2.816×4/16 ∼ 2.02; but if  ∼ 1/32 those distributions differ
by only 1.42. In the latter case it means that the outputs of K? on b1 and b2 are almost
indistinguishable.
The parameter  depends on the randomness implemented in the basic mechanism
K; we investigate that further in §4.
3.2 Properties of Earth Mover’s Privacy
In machine learning a number of “distance measures” are used in classification or clus-
tering tasks, and in this section we explore some properties of privacy when we vary
the underlying metrics of an Earth Mover’s metric used to classify complex objects.
Let v, v′ ∈ Rn be real-valued n-dimensional vectors. We use the following (well-
known) metrics. Recall in our applications we have looked at bags-of-words, where the
words themselves are represented as n-dimensional vectors. 11
1. Euclidean: ||v−v′|| :=
√∑
1≤i≤n(vi − v′i)2
2. Manhattan: bv−v′c := ∑1≤i≤n |vi − v′i|
Note that the Euclidean and Manhattan distances determine pseudometrics on words as
defined at Def. 2 and proved at Lem. 1.
Lemma 2. If dX ≤ dX ′ (point-wise), then EdX ≤ EdX′ (point-wise).
Proof. Trivial, by contradiction. If dX ≤ dX ′ and Fij , F ?ij are the minimal flow ma-
trices for EdX , EdX′ respectively, then F
?
ij is a (strictly smaller) minimal solution for
EdX which contradicts the minimality of Fij .
Corollary 1. If dX ≤ dX ′ (point-wise), then EdX -privacy implies EdX′ -privacy.
This shows that, for example, E||·||-privacy implies Eb·c-privacy, and indeed any
distance measure d which exceeds the Euclidean distance then E||·||-privacy implies
Ed-privacy.
We end this section by noting that Def. 4 satisfies post-processing; i.e. that privacy
does not decrease under post processing. We write K;K ′ for the composition of mech-
anisms K,K ′ : BX → D(BX ), defined:
(K;K ′)(b)(Z) :=
∑
b′:BX
K(b)({b′})×K ′(b′)(Z) . (10)
Lemma 3. [Post processing] If K,K ′:BX → D(BX ) and K is EdX -private for
(pseudo)metric d on X then K;K ′ is EdX -private.
10 N. Fernandes et al.
3D plot Contour diagram
Fig. 2: Laplace density function Lap2 in R2
4 Earth Mover’s Privacy for bags of vectors in Rn
In Thm. 1 we have shown how to promote a privacy mechanism on components to
EdX -privacy on a bag of those components. In this section we show how to implement
a privacy mechanism satisfying (7), when the components are represented by high di-
mensional vectors in Rn and the underlying metric is taken Euclidean on Rn, which we
denote by || · ||.
We begin by summarising the basic probabilistic tools we need. A probability den-
sity function (PDF) over some domain D is a function φ : D→ [0, 1] whose value φ(z)
gives the “relative likelihood” of z. The probability density function is used to compute
the probability of an outcome “z ∈ A”, for some region A ⊆ D as follows:∫
A
φ(x) dx . (11)
In differential privacy, a popular density function used for implementing mecha-
nisms is the Laplacian, defined next.
Definition 5. Let n ≥ 0 be an integer  > 0 be a real, and v∈Rn. We define the
Laplacian probability density function in n-dimensions:
Lapn (v) := c

n×e−||v|| ,
where ||v|| =
√
(v21 + · · ·+ v2n), and cn is a real-valued constant satisfying the integral
equation 1 =
∫ · · · ∫Rn Lapn (v)dv1 . . . dvn.
When n = 1, we can compute c1 = /2, and when n = 2, we have that c

2 = 
2/2pi.
In privacy mechanisms, probability density functions are used to produce a “noisy”
version of the released data. The benefit of the Laplace distribution is that, besides
creating randomness, the likelihood that the released value is different from the true
value decreases exponentially. This implies that the utility of the data release is high,
whilst at the same time masking its actual value. In Fig. 2 the probability density func-
tion Lap2(v) depicts this situation, where we see that the highest relative likelihood of
11 As we shall see, in the machine learning analysis documents are represented as bags of n-
dimensional vectors (word embeddings), where each bag contains N such vectors.
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a randomly selected point on the plane being close to the origin, with the chance of
choosing more distant points diminishing rapidly. Once we are able to select a vector v′
in Rn according to Lapn , we can “add noise” to any given vector v as v+v′, so that the
true value v is highly likely to be perturbed only a small amount.
In order to use the Laplacian in Def. 5, we need to implement it. Andre´s et al. [4]
exhibited a mechanism for Lap2(v), and here we show how to extend that idea to the
general case. The main idea of the construction for Lap2(v) uses the fact that any vector
on the plane can be represented by spherical coordinates (r, θ), so that the probability of
selecting a vector distance no more than r from the origin can be achieved by selecting
r and θ independently. In order to obtain a distribution which overall is equivalent to
Lap2(v), Andre´s et al. computed that r must be selected according to a well-known
distribution called the “Lambert W” function, and θ is selected uniformly over the unit
circle. In our generalisation to Lapn (v), we observe that the same idea is valid [6].
Observe first that every vector in Rn can be expressed as a pair (r, p), where r is the
distance from the origin, and p is a point in Bn, the unit hypersphere in Rn. Now
selecting vectors according to Lapn (v) can be achieved by independently selecting r
and p, but this time r must be selected according to the Gamma distribution, and pmust
be selected uniformly over Bn. We set out the details next.
Definition 6. The Gamma distribution of (integer) shape n and scale δ > 0 is deter-
mined by the probability density function:
Gamnδ (r) :=
rn−1e−r/δ
δn(n−1!) . (12)
Definition 7. The uniform distribution over the surface of the unit hypersphere Bn is
determined by the probability density function:
Uniformn(v) :=
Γ (n2 )
npin/2
if v ∈ Bn else 0 , (13)
where Bn:= {v ∈ Rn | ||v|| = 1}, and Γ (α):= ∫∞
0
xα−1e−x dx is the “Gamma func-
tion”.
With Def. 6 and Def. 7 we are able to provide an implementation of a mechanism
which produces noisy vectors around a given vector in Rn according to the Laplacian
distribution in Def. 5. The first task is to show that our decomposition of Lapn is correct.
Lemma 4. The n-dimensional Laplacian Lapn (v) can be realised by selecting vectors
represented as (r, p), where r is selected according to Gamn1/(r) and p is selected
independently according to Uniformn(p).
Proof. (Sketch) The proof follows by changing variables to spherical coordinates and
then showing that
∫
A
Lapn (v) dv can be expressed as the product of independent selec-
tions of r and p.
We use a spherical-coordinate representation of v as:
r:= ||v|| , and
v1:= r cos θ1 , v2:= r sin θ1 cos θ2 , . . . vn:= r sin θ1 sin θ2 . . . , sin θn−2 sin θn−1 .
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Next we assume for simplicity that A is a hypersphere of radius R; with that we can
reason:∫
A
Lapn (v) dv
= ∫
||v||≤R c

n×e−|v| dv
“Def. 5; A is a hypersphere”
= ∫
||v||≤R c

n×e−
√
v21+···+v2n dv
“||v|| =√v21 + · · ·+ v2n”
= ∫
r≤R
∫
Aθ
cn×e−r ∂(z1,z2,...,zn)∂(r,θ1,...,θn−1) drdθ1 . . . dθn−1
“Change of variables to spherical coordinates; see below (14)”
= ∫
r≤R
∫
Aθ
cn×e−rrn−1 sinn−2 θ1 sinn−3 θ2 . . . sin2 θn−3 sin θn−2 drdθ1 . . . dθn−1 .
“See below (14)”
Now rearranging we can see that this becomes a product of two integrals. The first∫
r≤R e
−rrn−1 is over the radius, and is proportional to the integral of the Gamma
distribution Def. 6; and the second is an integral over the angular coordinates and is
proportional to the surface of the unit hypersphere, and corresponds to the PDF at (7).
We complete the details in the appendix App. A.2. Finally, for the “see below’s” we are
using the “Jacobian” with details given at App. A.2:
∂(z1, z2, . . . , zn)
∂(r, θ1, . . . , θn−1)
= rn−1 sinn−2 θ1 sinn−3 θ2 . . . (14)
We can now assemble the facts to demonstrate the n-Dimensional Laplacian.
Theorem 2 (n-Dimensional Laplacian). Given  > 0 and n ∈ Z+, let K : Rn →
DRn be a mechanism that, given a vector x ∈ Rn outputs a noisy value as follows:
x
K7−→ x+ x′
where x′ is represented as (r, p) with r ≥ 0, distributed according to Gamn1/(r) and
p ∈ Bn distributed according to Uniformn(p). Then K satisfies (7) from Thm. 1, i.e. K
satisfies ||·||-privacy where ||·|| is the Euclidean metric on Rn.
Proof. (Sketch) Let z, y ∈ Rn. We need to show that for any (measurable) set A ⊆ Rn
that:
K(z)(A)/K(y)(A) ≤ e||z−y|| . (15)
However (15) follows provided that the probability densities of respectively K(z) and
K(y) satisfy it. By Lem. 4 the probability density of K(z), as a function of x is dis-
tributed as Lapn (z−x); and similarly for the probability density of K(y). Hence we
reason:
Lapn (z−x)/Lapn (y−x)
= cn×e−||z−x||/cn×e−||y−x|| “Def. 5”
= e−||z−x|| × e||y−x|| “Arithmetic”
≤ e||z−y|| , “Triangle inequality; s 7→ es is monotone”
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as required.
Thm. 2 reduces the problem of adding Laplace noise to vectors in Rn to selecting
a real value according to the Gamma distribution and an independent uniform selection
of a unit vector. Several methods have been proposed for generating random variables
according to the Gamma distribution [29] as well as for the uniform selection of vectors
on the unit n-sphere [34]. The uniform selection of a unit vector has also been described
in [34]; it avoids the transformation to spherical coordinates by selecting n random
variables from the standard normal distribution to produce vector v ∈ Rn, and then
normalising to output v|v| .
4.1 Earth Mover’s Privacy in BRn
Using the n-dimensional Laplacian, we can now implement an algorithm for NE||·||-
privacy. Algorithm 1 takes a bag of n-dimensional vectors as input and applies the
n-dimensional Laplacian mechanism described in Thm. 2 to each vector in the bag,
producing a noisy bag of n-dimensional vectors as output. Cor. 2 summarises the pri-
vacy guarantee.
Algorithm 1 Earth Mover’s Privacy Mechanism
Require: vector v, dimension n, epsilon 
1: procedure GENERATENOISYVECTOR(v, n, )
2: r ← Gamma(n, 1

)
3: u← U(n)
4: return v + ru
5: end procedure
Require: bag X , dimension n, epsilon 
1: procedure GENERATEPRIVATEBAG(X,n, )
2: Z ← ()
3: for all x ∈ X do
4: z ← GENERATENOISYVECTOR(x, n, )
5: add z to Z
6: end for
7: return Z
8: end procedure
Corollary 2. Algorithm 1 satisfies NE||·||-privacy, relative to any two bags in BRn of
size N .
Proof. Follows from Thm. 1 and Thm. 2.
4.2 Utility Bounds
We prove a lower bound on the utility for this algorithm, which applies for high dimen-
sional data representations. Given an output element x, we define Z to be the set of
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outputs within distance ∆ > 0 from x. Recall that the distance function is a measure of
utility, therefore Z = {z | E||·||(x, z) ≤ ∆} represents the set of vectors within utility
∆ of x. Then we have the following:
Theorem 3. Given an input bag b consisting of N n-dimensional vectors, the mecha-
nism defined by Algorithm 1 outputs an element from Z = {z | E||·||(b, z) ≤ ∆} with
probability at least
1− e−N∆en−1(N∆) ,
whenever N∆ ≤ n/e. (Recall that ek(α) =
∑
0≤i≤k
αi
i! , the sum of the first k + 1
terms in the series for eα .)
Proof. (Sketch) Let b ∈ (Rn)N be a (fixed) vector representation of the bag b. For
v ∈ (Rn)N , let v◦ ∈ BRn be the bag comprising the N components if v. Observe that
NE||·||(b, v◦) ≤M||·||(b, v), and so
ZM = {v |M||·||(b, v) ≤ N∆} ⊆ {v | E||·||(b, v◦) ≤ ∆} = ZE . (16)
Thus the probability of outputting an element of Z is the same as the probability of
outputting ZE , and by (16) that is at least the probability of outputting an element
from ZM by applying a standard n-dimensional Laplace mechanism to each of the
components of b. We can now compute:
Probability of outputting an element in ZE
≥ ∫ · · · ∫
v∈ZM
∏
1≤i≤N Lap
n
 (bi−vi)dv1 . . . dvN
“(16)”
= ∫ · · · ∫
v∈ZM
∏
1≤i≤N c

ne
−||bi−vi||dv1 . . . dvN .
“Lem. 4”
The result follows by completing the multiple integrals and applying some approxima-
tions, whilst observing that the variables in the integration are n-dimensional vector
valued. The details appear in App. A.2.
We note that our application word embeddings are typically mapped to vectors in
R300, thus we would use n ∼ 300 in Thm. 3.
5 Text Document Privacy
In this section we bring everything together, and present a privacy mechanism for text
documents; we explore how it contributes to the author obfuscation task described
above. Algorithm 2 describes the complete procedure for taking a document as a bag-of-
words, and outputting a “noisy” bag-of-words. Depending on the setting of parameter
, the output bag will be likely to be classified to be on a similar topic as the input.
Algorithm 2 uses a function Vec to turn the input document into a bag of word
embeddings; next Algorithm 1 produces a noisy bag of word embeddings, and, in a
final step the inverse Vec−1 is used to reconstruct an actual bag-of-words as output. In
our implementation of Algorithm 2, described below, we compute Vec−1(x) to be the
wordw that minimises the Euclidean distance ||z−Vec(w)||. The next result summarises
the privacy guarantee for Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Document privacy mechanism
Require: Bag-of-words b, dimension n, epsilon , Word embedding Vec : S → Rn
1: procedure GENERATENOISYBAGOFWORDS(b, n, ,Vec)
2: X ← Vec?(b)
3: Z ← GENERATEPRIVATEBAG(X,n, )
4: return (Vec−1)?(Z)
5: end procedure
Note that Vec? : BS → BRn applies Vec to each word in a bag b, and (Vec−1)? : BRn →
BS reverses this procedure as a post-processing step; this involves determining the word w that
minimises the Euclidean distance ||z − Vec(w)|| for each z in Z.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 satisfies NEdS -privacy, where dS = distVec. That is to say:
given input documents (bags) b, b′ both of size N , and c a possible output bag, define
the following quantities as follows: k:=E||·||(Vec?(b),Vec?(b′)) , pr(b, c) and pr(b′, c)
are the respective probabilities that c is output given the input was b or b′. Then:
pr(b, c) ≤ eNk × pr(b′, c) .
Proof. The result follows by appeal to Thm. 2 for privacy on the word embeddings; the
step to apply Vec−1 to each vector is a post-processing step which by Lem. 3 preserves
the privacy guarantee.
Although Thm. 4 utilises ideas from differential privacy, an interesting question to
ask is how it contributes to the PAN@Clef author obfuscation task, which recall asked
for mechanisms that preserve content but mask features that distinguish authorship. Al-
gorithm 2 does indeed attempt to preserve content (to the extent that the topic can still
be determined) but it does not directly “remove stylistic features”. So has it, in fact,
disguised the author’s characteristic style? To answer that question, we review Thm. 4
and interpret what it tells us in relation to author obfuscation. The theorem implies that
it is indeed possible to make the (probabilistic) output from two distinct documents
b, b′ almost indistinguishable by choosing  to be extremely small in comparison with
N×E||·||(Vec?(b),Vec?(b′)). However, if E||·||(Vec?(b),Vec?(b′)) is very large – mean-
ing that b and b′ are on entirely different topics, then  would need to be so tiny that
the noisy output document would be highly unlikely to be on a topic remotely close to
either b or b′ (recall Lem. 3).
This observation is actually highlighting the fact that, in some circumstances, the
topic itself is actually a feature that characterises author identity. (First-hand accounts
of breaking the world record for highest and longest free fall jump would immediately
narrow the field down to the title holder.) This means that any obfuscating mechanism
would, as for Algorithm 2, only be able to obfuscate documents so as to disguise the
author’s identity if there are several authors who write on similar topics. And it is in
that spirit, that we have made the first step towards a satisfactory obfuscating mecha-
nism: provided that documents are similar in topic (i.e. are close when their embeddings
are measured by E||·||) they can be obfuscated so that it is unlikely that the content is
disturbed, but that the contributing authors cannot be determined easily.
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We can see the importance of the “indistinguishability” property wrt. the PAN ob-
fuscation task. In stylometry analysis the representation of words for eg. author clas-
sification is completely different to the word embeddings which have used for topic
classification. State-of-the-art author attribution algorithms represent words as “charac-
ter n-grams” [27] which have been found to capture stylistic clues such as systematic
spelling errors. A character 3-gram for example represents a given word as the com-
plete list of substrings of length 3. For example character 3-gram representations of
“color” and “colour” are:
· “color” 7→ |[ “col”, “olo”, “lor” ]|
· “colour” 7→ |[ “col”, “olo”, “lou”, “our” ]|
For author identification, any output from Algorithm 2 would then need to be further
transformed to a bag of character n-grams, as a post processing step; by Lem. 3 this
additional transformation preserves the privacy properties of Algorithm 2. We explore
this experimentally in the next section.
6 Experimental Results
Document Set The PAN@Clef tasks and other similar work have used a variety of
types of text for author identification and author obfuscation. Our desiderata are that we
have multiple authors writing on one topic (so as to minimise the ability of an author
identification system to use topic-related cues) and to have more than one topic (so
that we can evaluate utility in terms of accuracy of topic classification). Further, we
would like to use data from a domain where there are potentially large quantities of text
available, and where it is already annotated with author and topic.
Given these considerations, we chose “fan fiction” as our domain. Wikipedia defines
fan fiction as follows: “Fan fiction . . . is fiction about characters or settings from an
original work of fiction, created by fans of that work rather than by its creator.” This
is also the domain that was used in the PAN@Clef 2018 author attribution challenge,12
although for this work we scraped our own dataset. We chose one of the largest fan
fiction sites and the two largest “fandoms” there;13 these fandoms are our topics. We
scraped the stories from these fandoms, the largest proportion of which are for use in
training our topic classification model. We held out two subsets of size 20 and 50, evenly
split between fandoms/topics, for the evaluation of our privacy mechanism.14 We follow
the evaluation framework of [27]: for each author we construct an known-author TEXT
and an unknown-author SNIPPET that we have to match to an author on the basis of the
known-author texts. (See Appendix B.1 for more detail.)
12 https://pan.webis.de/clef18/pan18-web/author-identification.
html
13 https://www.fanfiction.net/book/, with the two largest fandoms being Harry
Potter (797,000 stories) and Twilight (220,000 stories).
14 Our Algorithm 2 is computationally quite expensive, because each word w = Vec−1(x) re-
quires the calculation of Euclidean distance with respect to the whole vocabulary. We thus use
relatively small evaluation sets, as we apply the algorithm to them for multiple values of .
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Word Embeddings There are sets of word embeddings trained on large datasets that
have been made publicly available. Most of these, however, are already normalised,
which makes them unsuitable for our method. We therefore use the Google News
word2vec embeddings as the only large-scale unnormalised embeddings available. (See
Appendix B.1 for more detail.)
Inference Mechanisms We have two sorts of machine learning inference mechanisms:
our adversary mechanism for author identification, and our utility-related mechanism
for topic classification. For each of these, we can define inference mechanisms both
within the same representational space or in a different representational space. As we
noted above, in practice both author identification adversary and topic classification will
use different representations, but examining same-representation inference mechanisms
can give an insight into what is happening within that space.
Different-representation author identification For this we use the algorithm by [27].
This algorithm is widely used: it underpins two of the winners of PAN shared tasks [24,
47]; is a common benchmark or starting point for other methods [18, 39, 44, 46]; and
is a standard inference attacker for the PAN shared task on authorship obfuscation.15 It
works by representing each text as a vector of space-separated character n-gram counts,
and comparing repeatedly sampled subvectors of known-author texts and snippets using
cosine similarity. We use as a starting point the code from a reproducibility study [40],
but have modified it to improve efficiency. (See Appendix B.2 for more details.)
Different-representation topic classification Here we choose fastText [7, 21], a high-
performing supervised machine learning classification system. It also works with word
embeddings; these differ from word2vec in that they are derived from embeddings over
character n-grams, learnt using the same skipgram model as word2vec. This means it
is able to compute representations for words that do not appear in the training data,
which is helpful when training with relatively small amounts of data; also useful when
training with small amounts of data is the ability to start from pretrained embeddings
trained on out-of-domain data that are then adapted to the in-domain (here, fan fiction)
data. After training, the accuracy on a validation set we construct from the data is 93.7%
(see Appendix B.2 for details).
Same-representation author identification In the space of our word2vec embeddings,
we can define an inference mechanism that for an unknown-author snippet chooses the
closest known-author text by Euclidean distance.
Same-representation topic classification Similarly, we can define an inference mecha-
nism that considers the topic classes of neighbours and predicts a class for the snippet
based on that. This is essentially the standard k “Nearest Neighbours” technique (k-
NN) [20], a non-parametric method that assigns the majority class of the k nearest
neighbours. 1-NN corresponds to classification based on a Voronoi tesselation of the
space, has low bias and high variance, and asymptotically has an error rate that is never
15 http://pan.webis.de/clef17/pan17-web/author-obfuscation.html
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more than twice the Bayes rate; higher values of k have a smoothing effect. Because of
the nature of word embeddings, we would not expect this classification to be as accu-
rate as the fastText classification above: in high-dimensional Euclidean space (as here),
almost all points are approximately equidistant. Nevertheless, it can give an idea about
how a snippet with varying levels of noise added is being shifted in Euclidean space
with respect to other texts in the same topic. Here, we use k = 5. Same-representation
author identification can then be viewed as 1-NN with author as class.
20-author set
 SRauth SRtopic DRauth DRtopic
none 12 16 15 18
30 8 18 16 18
25 8 18 14 17
20 5 11 11 16
15 2 11 12 17
10 0 15 11 19
50-author set
 SRauth SRtopic DRauth DRtopic
none 19 36 27 43
30 19 37 29 43
25 17 34 24 41
20 12 28 19 42
15 9 22 13 42
10 1 24 10 43
Table 1: Number of correct predictions of author/topic in the 20-author set (left) and 50-
author set (right), using 1-NN for same-representation author identification (SRauth),
5-NN for same-representation topic classification (SRtopic), the Koppel algorithm
for different-representation author identification (DRauth) and fastText for different-
representation topic classification (DRtopic).
Results: Table 1 contains the results for both document sets, for the unmodified snippets
(“none”) or with the privacy mechanism of Algorithm 2 applied with various levels of :
we give results for  between 10 and 30, as at  = 40 the text does not change, while at
 = 1 the text is unrecognisable. For the 20-author set, a random guess baseline would
give 1 correct author prediction, and 10 correct topic predictions; for the 50-author set,
these values are 1 and 25 respectively.
Performance on the unmodified snippets using different-representation inference
mechanisms is quite good: author identification gets 15/20 correct for the 20-author set
and 27/50 for the 50-author set; and topic classification 18/20 and 43/50 (comparable to
the validation set accuracy, although slightly lower, which is to be expected given that
the texts are much shorter). For various levels of , with our different-representation
inference mechanisms we see broadly the behaviour we expected: the performance of
author identification drops, while topic classification holds roughly constant. Author
identification here does not drop to chance levels: we speculate that this is because (in
spite of our choice of dataset for this purpose) there are still some topic clues that the
algorithm of [27] takes advantage of: one author of Harry Potter fan fiction might prefer
to write about a particular character (e.g. Severus Snape), and as these character names
are not in our word2vec vocabulary, they are not replaced by the privacy mechanism.
In our same-representation author identification, though, we do find performance
starting relatively high (although not as high as the different-representation algorithm)
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and then dropping to (worse than) chance, which is the level we would expect for our
privacy mechanism. The k-NN topic classification, however, shows some instability,
which is probably an artefact of the problems it faces with high-dimensional Euclidean
spaces. (We show a sample of texts and nearest neighbours in Appendix B.3)
7 Related Work
Author Obfuscation The most similar work to ours is by Weggenmann and Kerschbaum
[53] who also consider the author obfuscation problem but apply standard differential
privacy using a Hamming distance of 1 between all documents. As with our approach,
they consider the simplified utility requirement of topic preservation and use word em-
beddings to represent documents. Our approach differs in our use of the Earth Mover’s
metric to provide a strong utility measure for document similarity.
An early work in this area by Kacmarcik et al. [22] applies obfuscation by modi-
fying the most important stylometric features of the text to reduce the effectiveness of
author attribution. This approach was used in Anonymouth [35], a semi-automated tool
that provides feedback to authors on which features to modify to effectively anonymise
their texts. A similar approach was also followed by Karadhov et al. [23] as part of the
PAN@Clef 2017 task.
Other approaches to author obfuscation, motivated by the PAN@Clef task, have
focussed on the stronger utility requirement of semantic sensibility [5, 8, 33]. Privacy
guarantees are therefore ad hoc and are designed to increase misclassification rates by
the author attribution software used to test the mechanism.
Most recently there has been interest in training neural networks models which can
protect author identity whilst preserving the semantics of the original document [14,
48]. Other related deep learning methods aim to obscure other author attributes such
as gender or age [10, 31]. While these methods produce strong empirical results, they
provide no formal privacy guarantees. Importantly, their goal also differs from the goal
of our paper: they aim to obscure properties of authors in the training set (with the in-
tention of the author-obscured learned representations being made available), while we
assume that an adversary may have access to raw training data to construct an inference
mechanism with full knowledge of author properties, and in this context aim to hide the
properties of some other text external to the training set.
Machine Learning and Differential Privacy Outside of author attribution, there is quite
a body of work on introducing differential privacy to machine learning: [13] gives an
overview of a classical machine learning setting; more recent deep learning approaches
include [1, 49]. However, these are generally applied in other domains such as image
processing: text introduces additional complexity because of its discrete nature, in con-
trast to the continuous nature of neural networks. A recent exception is [36], which
constructs a differentially private language model using a recurrent neural network; the
goal here, as for instances above, is to hide properties of data items in the training set.
Generalised Differential Privacy Also known as dX -privacy [9], this definition was
originally motivated by the problem of geo-location privacy [4]. Despite its generality,
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dX -privacy has yet to find significant applications outside this domain; in particular,
there have been no applications to text privacy.
Text Document Privacy This typically refers to the sanitisation or redaction of doc-
uments either to protect the identity of individuals or to protect the confidentiality of
their sensitive attributes. For example, a medical document may be modified to hide
specifics in the medical history of a named patient. Similarly, a classified document
may be redacted to protect the identity of an individual referred to in the text.
Most approaches to sanitisation or redaction rely on first identifying sensitive terms
in the text, and then modifying (or deleting) only these terms to produce a sanitised
document. Abril et al. [2] proposed this two-step approach, focussing on identification
of terms using NLP techniques. Cumby and Ghani [11] proposed k − confusability,
inspired by k − anonymity [50], to perturb sensitive terms in a document so that
its (utility) class is confusable with at least k other classes. Their approach requires
a complete dataset of similar documents for computing (mis)classification probabili-
ties. Anandan et al. [3] proposed t-plausibility which generalises sensitive terms such
that any document could have been generated from at least t other documents. Sa´nchez
and Batet [45] proposed C-sanitisation, a model for both detection and protection of
sensitive terms (C) using information theoretic guarantees. In particular, a C-sanitised
document should contain no collection of terms which can be used to infer any of the
sensitive terms.
Finally, there has been some work on noise-addition techniques in this area. Rodriguez-
Garcia et al. [42] propose semantic noise, which perturbs sensitive terms in a document
using a distance measure over the directed graph representing a predefined ontology.
Whilst these approaches have strong utility, our primary point of difference is our
insistence on a differential privacy-based guarantee. This ensures that every output doc-
ument could have been produced from any input document with some probability, giv-
ing the strongest possible notion of plausible-deniability.
8 Conclusions
We have shown how to combine representations of text documents with generalised
differential privacy in order to implement a privacy mechanism for text documents.
Unlike most other techniques for privacy in text processing, ours provides a guarantee
in the style of differential privacy. Moreover we have demonstrated experimentally the
trade off between utility and privacy.
This represents an important step towards the implementation of privacy mecha-
nisms that could produce readable summaries of documents with a privacy guarantee.
One way to achieve this goal would be to reconstruct readable documents from the
bag-of-words output that our mechanism currently provides. A range of promising tech-
niques for reconstructing readable texts from bag-of-words have already produced some
good experimental results [19, 52, 54]. In future work we aim to explore how techniques
such as these could be applied as a final post processing step for our mechanism.
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A Appendix A
Here we present proofs omitted from the main body of the paper.
A.1 Proofs Omitted from §3
To prove Thm. 1 we introduce the following results.
Definition A1. An n×n matrix whose elements are non-negative and has all rows and
columns summing to 1 is called doubly stochastic. A doubly stochastic matrix which
contains only 1’s and 0’s is called a permutation matrix.
Theorem A1. (Birkhoff-von Neumann) The set of n × n doubly stochastic matrices
forms a convex polytope whose vertices are the n× n permutation matrices.
The Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem says that the set of doubly stochastic matrices
is a closed, bounded convex set, and every doubly stochastic matrix can be written as
a convex combination of the permutation matrices. We can now prove the following
result.
Lemma A1. LetD and F be non-negative n×n matrices. Then the problem of finding
an F which minimises
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
DijFij
subject to
n∑
i=1
Fij = 1 and
n∑
j=1
Fij = 1
always has an n× n permutation matrix as an optimal solution.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Let F ? be an optimal n × n solution matrix.
Since F ? is doubly stochastic we can apply Birkhoff-von Neumann. Firstly, we know
that such a solution exists (since the set of solutions is closed and bounded). We now
assume that F ? is not a permutation matrix, and also that no permutation matrix is
optimal. Let {P 1, P 2, . . . , P k} be the set of n × n permutation matrices. Then, by
Birkhoff-von Neumann, we can write
F ? = λ1P
1 + λ2P
2 + . . .+ λkP
k (17)
where λi ≥ 0 and
k∑
i=1
λi = 1. Since F ? is optimal and none of the P i are optimal, by
assumption we also know ∑
i,j
Pmij Dij >
∑
i,j
F ?ijDij (18)
for 0 < m ≤ k. And thus we have:
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i,j
F ?ijDij
=
∑
i,j
(λ1P
1
ij + . . .+ λkP
k
ij)Dij “(17)”
=
∑
i,j
λ1P
1
ijDij + . . .+
∑
i,j
λkP
k
ijDij “Factorising”
>
∑
i,j
λ1F
?
ijDij + . . .+
∑
i,j
λkF
?
ijDij “(18)”
= λ1
∑
i,j
F ?ijDij + . . .+ λk
∑
i,j
F ?ijDij “Arithmetic”
=
∑
i,j
F ?ijDij “
k∑
i=1
λi = 1”
which is a contradiction. Thus, either F ? is a permutation matrix, or there must be a
permutation matrix which is also optimal.
Now, for permutation σ ∈ {1 . . . N} → {1 . . . N} write cσ to be the vector with
components permuted by σ, so that cσi = cσ(i).
Lemma A2. Let dX be a pseudometric on X and let K : X → DX be a mechanism
satisfying dX -privacy. Let x, z ∈ BX be bags of length N with corresponding vectors
x, z ∈ XN . Then K can be extended to a mechanism K? : BX → D(BX ) satisfying:
K?(x)({z}) =
∑
σ
K(x)({zσ})
where the sum is over unique permutations of elements in z.
Proof. Recall that a mechanism is a probabilistic function; we have to show that there
is a mechanism K? that outputs a valid distribution over bags in BX given an input
bag in X . We show this by constructing the required mechanism.
We can easily extend K to a mechanism K ′ : XN → D(XN ) operating on vectors
by applying K to each element of x in order. That is,
K ′(x)({z}) = K(x1)(z1)×K(x2)(z2)× . . .×K(xn)(zn)
K ′(x) defines a valid probability distribution for any x since we sum over all pos-
sible output vectors z.
Observe that the mechanism K ′ produces the same output distribution regardless
of the ordering of elements in x (since the mechanism K operates on each element
independently). Therefore the distribution over bags depends only on the different per-
mutations of elements in the output z. That is,
K?(x)({z}) =
∑
σ
K(x1)(zσ(1))×K(x2)(zσ(2))× . . .×K(xn)(zσ(n))
Here K?(x) also defines a valid probability distribution, since it produces the same
distribution as K ′(x) except that the output probabilities are ‘collected’ for all permu-
tations of the output vector. Thus K? is the required mechanism. uunionsq
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We are now ready to prove Thm. 1.
Theorem 1. Let dX be a pseudometric on X and let K : X → DX be a mecha-
nism satisfying dX -privacy, i.e.
K(x)(Z) ≤ edX (x,x′)K(x′)(Z) , for all x, x′ ∈ X Z ⊆ X .
Let K∗ : BX → D(BX ) be the mechanism obtained by applying K independently to
each element of X for any X ∈ BX . Denote by K?↓N the restriction of K? to bags of
fixed size N . Then K?↓N satisfies NEdX -privacy.
Proof. Let b, b′ be input bags of sizeN , and c a possible output bag ofK?. Observe that
c also has size N . Therefore, the Earth Mover’s constraints in Def. 3 can be rewritten
as:
N∑
i=1
Fij =
1
|N | and
N∑
j=1
Fij =
1
|N | , Fij ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
This has the same form as in Lem. A1, thus the optimal transportation for EdX (b, c)
is achieved by moving each word in bag b to a single word in bag c. The same is true
for EdX (b
′, c) and EdX (b, b
′). Next, we fix b and b′ to be vector representations of
respectively b, b′ in XN such that the optimal transportation for EdX (b, b′) is
EdX (b, b
′) = 1/N×
∑
1≤i≤N
dX (bi, b
′
i) = MdX (b, b
′)/N . (19)
That is, we fix the ordering of the elements in the vectors b, b′ so that the Manhattan
distance is exactly the Earth Mover’s distance (which we know can be done thanks to
Lem. A1). Finally, from Lem. A2 we know that the following equality between proba-
bilities holds:
K?(b){c} =
∑
σ
K(b){cσ} , (20)
where the summation is over all permutations that give distinct vector representations
of c. We now compute directly:
K?(b){c}
=
∑
σK(b){cσ} “(20) for b, c”
≤ ∑σ eMd(b,b′)K(b′){cσ} “(6) for b, b′, c”
= eNEd(b,b
′)∑
σK(b
′){cσ} “Arithmetic and (19)”
= eNEd(b,b
′)K?(b′){c} , “(20) for b′, c”
Thus the mechanism K? satisfies NEdX -privacy for singleton sets, and by exten-
sion for all finite sets Z ⊆ BX .
uunionsq
Lemma 3. [Post processing] If K,K ′:BX → D(BX ) and K is EdX -private for
(pseudo)metric d on X then K;K ′ is EdX -private.
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Proof. Let b, c ∈ BX ; we reason as follows.
(K;K ′)(b)(Z)
=
∑
b′:BX K(b)({b′})×K ′(b′)(Z) “(10)”
≤ ∑b′:BX eEdX (b,c)K(c)({b′})×K ′(b′)(Z) “K is Ed-private”
=
eEdX (b,c)(K;K ′)(c)(Z) .
“(10); arithmetic”
A.2 Proofs Omitted from §4
Lemma 4. The n-dimensional Laplacian Lapn (v) can be realised by selecting vectors
represented as (r, p), where r is selected according to Gamn1/(r) and p is selected
independently according to Uniformn(p).
Proof. We note first that the n-dimensional Laplacian is spherically symmetric; that is,
we want the length of the random vector to follow a Laplacian distribution indepen-
dently from its direction. Therefore the Laplacian has a stochastic representation:
X = RU (21)
where R = ||X|| and U = X/||X||. i.e. U is a random variable drawn from the uniform
distribution on the n-sphere (that is, U ∼ Uniformn(p)) andR is a ‘scaling’ component
independent from U .
We now show that the radial component is drawn from the Gamma distribution.
From Def. 5 we have that ∫
· · ·
∫
Rn
Lapn (v)dv1 . . . dvn = 1
We perform a conversion to spherical co-ordinates (r, θ1, θ2, . . . , θn−1) using the fol-
lowing transformation [38]:
v1 = r cos θ1
v2 = r sin θ1 cos θ2
v3 = r sin θ1 sin θ2 cos θ3
. . .
vn−1 = r sin θ1 sin θ2 . . . sin θn−2 cos θn−1
vn = r sin θ1 sin θ2 . . . sin θn−2 sin θn−1
where r =
√
v21 + · · ·+ v2n. The bounds for the new co-ordinates are:
0 ≤ r <∞; 0 ≤ θ1 . . . θn−2 ≤ pi; 0 ≤ θn−1 ≤ 2pi (22)
We also need the Jacobian determinant, denoted ∂(v1,v2,...,vn)∂(r,θ1,...,θn−1) . This is well-known to
be:
∂(v1, v2, . . . , vn)
∂(r, θ1, . . . , θn−1)
= rn−1 sinn−2 θ1 sinn−3 θ2 . . . sin2 θn−3 sin θn−2 (23)
And therefore we reason:
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= ∫∞
−∞· · ·
∫∞
−∞ c

n×e−||v|| dv1 . . . dvn
“Def. 5; bounds”
= ∫∞
−∞· · ·
∫∞
−∞ c

n×e−
√
v21+···+v2n dv1 . . . dvn
“||v|| =√v21 + · · ·+ v2n”
= ∫∞
0
∫ pi
0
· · · ∫ 2pi
0
cn×e−r ∂(v1,v2,...,vn)∂(r,θ1,...,θn−1) drdθ1 . . . dθn−1
“Change of variables; (22)”
= ∫∞
0
∫ pi
0
· · · ∫ 2pi
0
cn×e−rrn−1 sinn−2 θ1 . . . sin2 θn−3 sin θn−2 drdθ1 . . . dθn−1
“(23)”
= ∫∞
0
c0×e−rrn−1 dr
∫ pi
0
c1 sin
n−2 θ1 dθ1· · ·
∫ pi
0
cn−2 sin θn−2 dθn−2
∫ 2pi
0
cn−1 dθn−1 .
“Independent variables; cn = c0 × c1 × · · · × cn−1”
We recognise the form of this integral as the stochastic representation of a spheri-
cally symmetric distribution. The first component is the radial component and the re-
mainder of the integrals represent the uniform distribution on the n-sphere. We can
compute the constant c0 by equating the radial component with a univariate distribu-
tion. That is,∫∞
0
c0×e−rrn−1 dr = 1
⇒
c0
∫∞
0
e−rrn−1 dr = 1
“c0 is constant”
⇒
c0(
−1
 r
n−1e−r)
∣∣∣∞
0
− c0
∫∞
0
−1
 e
−r(n− 1)×rn−2 dr = 1
“Integration by parts”
⇒
c0(n− 1)/
∫∞
0
e−rrn−2 dr = 1
“limr→∞ rn−1e−r = 0; simplifying”
⇒
c0(n− 1)!/n = 1
“Induction on r”
⇒
c0 = 
n/(n− 1)!
“Rearranging”
And now we can deduce the PDF of the radial distribution.
c0 × rn−1e−r
=
rn−1e−r×n/(n− 1)!
“Using c0 proven above”
=
Gamn1/(r)
“Def. 6”
Corollary A1. The n-dimensional Laplacian Lapn (v) = cn × e−||v|| has constant cn
given by
cn = 
n/(n−1)! Sn−1(1)
where Sn−1(1) is the surface area of the n-dimensional unit sphere.
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Proof. This follows from the observation that the integral∫ pi
0
c1 sin
n−2 θ1 dθ1· · ·
∫ pi
0
cn−2 sin θn−2 dθn−2
∫ 2pi
0
cn−1 dθn−1
must sum to 1 since we defined c0 such that the radial integral was a probability distri-
bution.
Lemma A3. For higher dimensions than 1 the probability of a random vector being
selected within a region is determined by a multiple integral; for the special case that
the region is D(R):= {v | ||v|| ≤ R}, then when v is sampled from a Lapn distribution,
the probability that it is contained in D(R), denoted Ln(R), is given by:
Ln(R) := 1−e−R × en−1(R) , (24)
where ek(α):=
∑
0≤i≤k α
i/i! .
Proof. Using Lem. 4 we can calculate this probability using the radial (Gamma) distri-
bution, since we defined the angular and radial distributions independently. That is,
Ln(R) =
∫ R
0
rn−1e−r×n/(n−1)! dr (25)
This has well-known CDF given by
Ln(R) = 1−
n−1∑
k=0
(R)k
k!
e−R
which we now prove. We note that
L1(R) =
∫ R
0
e−r dr = 1− e−R (26)
and using integration by parts we see that
Ln(R) = n/(n−1)!×[
−rn−1

e−r]
∣∣∣R
0
+
∫ R
0
rn−2e−r×n−1/(n−2)! dr
= −
n−1Rn−1
(n−1)! e
−R + Ln−1(R) (27)
And therefore
Probability of outputting an element in D(R)
= ∫ R
0
rn−1e−r×n/(n−1)! dr
“(25)”
=
1− e−R[1 +R+ R222! + R
33
3! + · · ·+ R
n−1n−1
(n−1)! ]
“(26) and (27); induction”
=
1− e−R×∑n−1k=0 Rkkk! “Arithmetic”
=
1− e−R×en−1(R)
“Simplifying”
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We now present the proof of Thm. 3. It follows as a consequence of of the next
theorem.
Theorem A2.∫
v∈ZM
∏
1≤i≤N
Lapn (bi−vi)dv1 . . . dvN ≥ 1−e−N∆en−1(N∆)
((cnVn(N∆))
N−1)
cnVn(N∆)−1
Proof. Let b ∈ (Rn)N be a (fixed) vector representation of the bag b. For v ∈ (Rn)N ,
let v◦ ∈ BRn be the bag comprising theN components if v. Observe thatNE||·||(b, v◦) ≤
M||·||(b, v), and so
ZM = {v |M||·||(b, v) ≤ N∆} ⊆ {v | E||·||(b, v◦) ≤ ∆} = ZE . (28)
Thus the probability of outputting an element of Z is the same as the probability of
outputting ZE , and by (28) that is at least the probability of outputting an element
from ZM by applying a standard n-dimensional Laplace mechanism to each of the
components of b. We can now compute:
Probability of outputting an element in ZE
≥ ∫
v∈ZM
∏
1≤i≤N Lap
n
 (bi−vi)dv1 . . . dvN
“(28)”
= ∫
v∈ZM
∏
1≤i≤N c

ne
−||bi−vi||dv1 . . . dvN .
“Lem. 4”
The result follows by completing the integration, and applying simplifying approxima-
tions.
Let
IN :=
∫
0≤∑1≤j≤N ||vj ||≤R
∏
1≤i≤N
Lapn (vi)dv1 . . . dvN (29)
We rewrite RHS this as:
∫
0≤∑1≤j≤N−1 ||vj ||≤R
∏
1≤i≤N−1
Lapn (vi)
∫
0≤||vN ||≤(R−
∑
1≤j≤N−1 ||vj ||)
Lapn (vN )dvN dv1 . . . dvN−1
(30)
Using Lem. A3 we can simplify the integral for vN , to obtain:
∫
0≤∑1≤j≤N−1 ||vj ||≤R
∏
1≤i≤N−1
Lapn (vi)[1− e−(R−
∑
1≤j≤N−1 ||vj ||)en−1((R−
∑
1≤j≤N−1
||vj ||))] dv1 . . . dvN−1
(31)
Rewriting the product
∏
1≤i≤N−1 Lap
n
 (vi) as (c

n)
N−1e−(
∑
1≤j≤N−1 ||vj ||) and us-
ing (29) we can simplify (31) to
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IN−1−e−R(cn)N−1
∫
0≤∑1≤j≤N−1 ||vj ||≤R en−1((R−
∑
1≤j≤N−1
||vj ||)) dv1 . . . dvN−1
(32)
We make two approximations. Observe that en−1 is an increasing function, and that
within the region of integration we have
((R−
∑
1≤j≤N−1
||vj ||)) ≤ R ,
so that (32) is at least
IN−1 − e−R(cn)N−1en−1(R)
∫
0≤∑1≤j≤N−1 ||vj ||≤R 1 dv1 . . . dvN−1 (33)
The final simplification is to note that the integral is no more than Vn(R)N−1, where
Vn(R) is the volume of an n-dimensional sphere. Putting all this together we have:
IN ≥ IN−1 − e−R(cn)N−1en−1(R)Vn(R)N−1 (34)
We can now unwind this inequation to obtain the result, noting that R:=N∆.
For the proof of Thm. 3, we need to make some further simplifications by using
some additional constraints on the data.
In our application we know that the word2vec embeddings are typically of the order
n ≥ 30. In this case we can make the following approximations to cnVn(R).
From Cor. A1 we can compute cn = c0/Sn−1(1), where c0 = 
n/(n−1)! and
Sn(1) is the surface of an n-dimensional unit sphere. Using exact formulae for Vn(R)
and Sn−1(1) we obtain:
cnVn(R) = 
n/(n− 1)!× pi
n/2Rn
Γ (1 + n/2)
× Γ (1 + n/2)
npin/2
=
(R)n
n!
(35)
Using Stirling’s approximation for n! we obtain
cnVn(R) ≈
(
eR
n
)n
× 1√
2pin
(36)
Comparing to our formula for Thm. 3, we can see that if we set eR ≤ n then (36)
is less than 1√
2pin
and so, for n ≥ 30, we have
((cnVn(N∆))
N−1)
cnVn(N∆)−1
≈ 1
giving finally that if eN∆ ≤ n then the utility calculation reduces to:
∫
· · ·
∫
v∈ZM
∏
1≤i≤N
Lapn (bi−vi)dv1 . . . dvN ≥ 1− e−N∆en−1(N∆)
which would be expected of a linear-like integration over an n-dimensional variable.
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B Experimental Details
Here we describe further details of our constructed dataset and implemented inference
mechanisms to support replicability, along with some additional analysis.
B.1 Dataset Construction
Document Sets Following [27], we take the first 2000 words of each story to constitute
the known-author TEXT, and the final 1000 words of each to constitute the unknown-
author SNIPPET. We then normalise the text (removing stopwords and punctuation, and
lowercasing, which are standard for topic classification) and then — because our mech-
anism requires each bag-of-words document to be of a fixed size N — truncate each
text or snippet to the length of the shortest one in the set. So for our 20-author set the
texts are of length 420, and for the 50-author set length 402.
Word Embeddings The Google News word2vec embeddings16 are 300-dimensional
embeddings that were trained on about 100 billion words of news text and in full contain
about 3 million words and phrases. To make our experiments computationally feasible,
we restricted our vocabulary to the 100,000 most frequent words for our 20-document
dataset and the 30,000 most frequent words for our 50-document dataset.
B.2 Inference Mechanism Implementation Details
Different-representation author identification The algorithm of [27] does not require
any training for our purposes. (In tasks where a “don’t know” answer is permitted,
there is a threshold parameter σ that can be learnt, but we do not use this.) There are a
few hyperparameters to the method (e.g. size of character n-grams, number of character
n-grams in the feature vector); for the most part we use the hyperparameter settings of
the replication we used as our starting point17 [40], which were set on the basis of the
empirical analysis of [27]. Only the minimum text length for training is changed to 400,
given the length of our texts.
Different-representation topic classification In training, we use pretrained embeddings
trained on about 16 billion words of English Wikipedia text.18 Our in-domain dataset
consists of texts from 500 authors chosen at random, some of whom had written mul-
tiple stories; from this we derived a training set of 448 known-author texts of size
2000 each, split evenly between the two topics, and a comparable validation set of
111 known-author texts. We trained the classifier for 25 epochs, with learning rate 1.0.
On the validation set, the accuracy is 0.937.
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snippet i di ai
4-Bad-Boys-of-Twilight-0.txt 1 2.112 AliceInMyWonderland
2 2.136 AliciaMarieSwan
3 2.147 Bad-Boys-of-Twilight
4-Anything-Goes-Twific-Contest-1.txt 1 1.618 Anything-Goes-Twific-Contest
2 1.773 91BlackMoon
3 1.805 AliciaMarieSwan
0-dorahatesexploring-0.txt 1 1.844 dorahatesexploring
2 1.879 Dr-Mini-me
3 1.974 k-kizkhalifa
4-chiriko1117-0.txt 1 1.913 Dr-Mini-me
2 1.948 AliciaMarieSwan
3 1.986 91BlackMoon
0-FateRogue-2.txt 1 1.798 FateRogue
2 1.854 Dr-Mini-me
3 1.896 AliciaMarieSwan
Table 2: Distances for a sample of unmodified snippets from the 20-author dataset. di
is the distance to ith closest neighbour known-author text; ai is the identity of the ith
closest author.
B.3 Analysis of Examples
Table 2 illustrates the three closest distances for a sample of unknown-author snippets,
along with their authors. It can be seen that the distances are relatively close, a conse-
quence of the high-dimensional Euclidean space.
 words 1–6
none heard grandfather pollux dubbed uncle alphard
30 heard grandfather pollux orient grandma alphard
20 Walt Disney grandfather pollux orient grandma alphard
10 Walt Disney Guinness Book pollux tilted Public Defender alphard
 words 7–11
none sympathizer disowned regulus hurt felt
30 sympathizer disowned regulus Harrison feels
20 sympathizer Records regulus culprits algebra
10 premeditated murder ENERGY STAR regulus culprits plagiarism
Table 3: The beginnings of one particular snippet under various levels of .
16 https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/
17 https://github.com/pan-webis-de/koppel11
18 https://fasttext.cc/docs/en/english-vectors.html
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Table 3 illustrates some of the changes introduced by the privacy mechanism under
various levels of  for a single sample snippet.  = 30 produces very minor changes,
mostly semantically close (felt→ feels, uncle→ grandma), but with some greater ran-
domness as well (hurt→ Harrison). This increases as  decreases, until there are some
very unlikely words (e.g. ENERGY STAR), as expected.
In a practical application, such unlikely words or phrases like ENERGY STAR would
look rather out of place with respect to the domain. However, our choice of word2vec
vocabulary for this experiment was in a sense arbitrary; a practical application could
use a vocabulary tailored to the domain, by (say) culling entries that do not appear in a
training set.
